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Abstract: This paper provides an overview of the credit provision in the Czech Re-
public at the beginning of the transition period. We show the economic forces leading to
the creation of specialized government credit guarantee institution. While we provide a
brief overview of different credit support institutions, we concentrate on credit guarantees
in Czech agriculture, food industry and forestry. Besides the description of credit support
activities, we also pay attention to financial sources of credit guarantee institution. Impor-
tant financial source was its stock endowment which originated in the Czech privatization
scheme. We provide an estimation of the value of this initial endowment according to two
stock markets operating in the Czech Republic.
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1 The Empirics of Agricultural Credit
1.1 Financial Situation of Farmers and Agricultural Credit
In the pre-reform period up to the end of 1989, agriculture was a heavily preferred branch
of the Czech economy. The standard of living of the agricultural population, especially the
level of wages, was approximately equal to the economy-wide averages. The profitability
of agricultural production was ensured by indirect government subsidies in the price of
agricultural inputs and in food prices.
The majority of agricultural production was realized in cooperatives, which were less
directly connected with the government budget and central planning than the state farms
and industrial enterprises, which were directly state owned. One of the major tools govern-
ment used to influence agricultural cooperatives was the state owned banking and credit
provision. The credit provision for cooperatives was not as soft as the credit provision
for industrial enterprises. As a consequence of this higher level of economic independence
of cooperatives the volume of outstanding credit in agriculture was relatively low at the
beginning of the reforms in the early 90’s. In 1991, the share of credits outstanding as com-
pared to capital stocks was 20% in agriculture while the same indicator in industry was
37% (Statistical Yearbook of the Czechoslovakia, 1992, pp. 177, 180). Approximately 3/4
of agricultural credit was short term credit used primarily for the financing of technological
supplies connected with the seasonal character of agricultural production (Becvarova and
Fritzova, 1994a, p.2).
This initial situation could suggest that during the transition the credit provision to
agriculture would rise to converge towards the economy wide average following the elimi-
nation of command economy distortions in resource allocation. But the situation was not
so straightforward. It is shown in Table 1 that during the transition period up to the end
of 1994, the volume of credit extended to agriculture was steadily decreasing in absolute
terms, while total economy-wide credits absolutely increased.
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Table 1: Credit outstanding as of year-end.
Unit 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995
Total credit bil. Kc 498.7 578.6 672.3 776.5 825.7
Agricultural credit bil. Kc 36.3 27.4 26.4 25.7 30.2
Share of agricultural % 7.3 4.7 3.9 3.4 3.7
credit from total credit
Sources: 1. Data for 1991; estimated from Czechoslovak data in Statistical Yearbook of
the Czech Republic (1993, p.138).
2. Data for 1992-94; Statistical Yearbook of the Czech Republic (1995, p.163).
3. Data for 1995; Selected Indicators of Monetary Development of the Czech Republic
(1996, pp.22, 23).
The data in Table 2 show that the decrease in credit provision to agriculture cannot
be explained only by the downsizing of agriculture. Following the sharp drop in agricul-
tural production and the reduction of the share of agricultural GDP out of total Czech
GDP at the start of the transformation, this share has been stable since 1991. The ev-
idence presented by Table 2 contrasts with the reduction of the agricultural work force
(Table 3), which is usually presented by the Czech agricultural policymakers as proof of
rapid downsizing of Czech agriculture.
Probably a more important reason for the decrease in credit provision was the unwill-
ingness of commercial banks to extend credit to agricultural firms. This unwillingness
is understandable since the usual indicators of economic performance, which are used by
bankers in the evaluation of loan applications, were much more favourable for industry
than for agriculture during the transition period. The time series of the profitability of
revenues, as one of the more important indicators, is presented in Table 4 and it clearly
labels agriculture as a very badly performing area in the eyes of bankers.
The bad credit rating of agriculture and the riskiness of agricultural credit is also
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Table 2: Gross domestic product at factor costs (in bil. Kc at current prices).
1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995
Czech total 492 515 664 703 799 1000 1160
Agriculture 42 37 35 41 48 58 61
Share of agricultural 8.5 7.2 5.3 5.8 6.0 5.8 5.3
on total GDP (in %)
Sources: 1. Data for 1989-1991; Statistical Yearbook of the Czech Republic (1993, p.106).
2. Data for 1992-1993; Statistical Yearbook of the Czech Republic (1994, pp.98, 99).
3. Data for 1994; Statistical Yearbook of the Czech Republic (1995, p.124).
4. Data for 1995; The Estimate of the Creation and the Use of the GDP, 4th quarter of
1995 (1996, p.15).
Note: Beginning with 1993, GDP includes imputed interest.
Table 3: Employment in the Czech economy and in agriculture (in thousands of employees).
1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995
Czech total 5403 5351 5059 4927 4848 4885 5014
Agriculture 533 514 411 312 271 247 222
Share of agricultural 9.9 9.6 8.1 6.3 5.6 5.1 4.4
on total employment (in %)
Source: 1. Data for 1990:The Report on the State of the Czech Agriculture (1995, p.249).
2. Agricultural data for 1989, 1991–1995: The Report on the State of the Czech Agriculture
(1996, appendix table P1/03).
3. Czech total data for 1989, 1991–1995: The Report on the State of the Czech Agriculture
(1996, appendix table A 3.3/01).
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Table 4: Profitability of revenues in agriculture and in the whole Czech economy (in %)
1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995
Agriculture 6.82 5.99 -9.45 -15.28 -9.94 -2.57 0.59
Czech total 10.86 10.91 9.21 7.21 2.48 3.43 4.17
Sources: 1. Data for 1989; Statistical Yearbook of Czechoslovakia (1990, pp. 170, 171).
2. Data for 1990; Statistical Yearbook of Czechoslovakia (1991, pp. 168, 169).
3. Data for 1991; Statistical Yearbook of Czechoslovakia (1992, pp.165, 166).
4. Data for 1992; Statistical Yearbook of the Czech Republic (1993, pp. 131, 132).
5. Data for 1993; Statistical Yearbook of the Czech Republic (1994, p. 111).
6. Data for 1994; Statistical Yearbook of the Czech Republic (1995, p. 147).
7. Data for 1995; Revised Financial Indicators of Non-financial Enterprises and Corpora-
tions in 1995 Yearly and Quarterly (1996, pp. 13, 71).
documented by the high percentage of classified credit (defined as doubtful, losing, non-
standard and other kinds of very risky credit), which in November 1994 accounted for
58.9% of the total agricultural credit. The corresponding economy-wide share was 35%
(The Report on the State of the Czech Agriculture, 1995, p.137).
Czech farmers (together with entrepreneurs in all branches of the Czech economy and,
for that matter, together with entrepreneurs in other transition economies who were not
used to high open inflation under a centrally planned economy) loudly complained about
high interest rates. The data in Table 5 show that in comparison with the level of inflation,
the interest rates seem quite reasonable.
1.2 Government Support to Agriculture
Up to the end of the 80’s, the government support of agriculture in all transition economies
had a very different nature and forms as compared to the situation in the 90’s. In the pre-
reform period, agriculture in all transition countries was administratively isolated from
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Table 5: Interest and inflation rates (in %)
1985 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995
Average interest 5.04 5.70 6.16 14.46 13.53 14.08 13.11 12.80
-short term NA NA NA 16.00 15.94 15.61 13.37 12.73
-intermediate term NA NA NA 14.18 15.64 15.91 14.96 14.33
-long term NA NA NA 11.22 9.96 10.42 10.96 11.35
Inflation rate 2.20 1.00 9.70 56.60 11.10 20.80 10.00 9.10
Source: 1. Credit data for 1985–1992; Statistical Yearbook of the Czech Republic (1995,
p.139).
2. Credit data for 1993–1994; Statistical Yearbook of the Czech Republic (1995, p.163).
3. Credit data for 1995; Selected Indicators of Monetary Development of the Czech Re-
public (1996, p.75).
4. Inflation rate for 1985–1994; Statistical Yearbook of the Czech Republic (1995, pp.26-
27).
5. Inflation rate for 1995; Monthly Statistics of the Czech Republic (1996, p.146).
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the world market, so the export and import interventions had very different forms from
those used in market economies. In the internal markets, the support for agriculture
was primarily channelled indirectly through subsidies connected with prices of agricultural
inputs and outputs. Significant support to agriculture also went through general social
programs designed to improve the quality of life of the population as a whole and to
equalize the standards of living between rural and urban populations.
From the beginning of the 90’s, the Czech government abolished the previous interven-
tions in pricing goods and it also rejected the idea of the “welfare state.” In 1991-1993,
the main tools of government intervention in Czech agriculture were the State Fund for
Market Regulation and the subsidies provided under the subsidy programs of the Ministry
of Agriculture.
The State Fund for Market Regulation (SFMR) is a government run agency, which buys
certain agricultural products under certain conditions, stores them (or arranges for their
storage by contract with some commercial enterprises) and again sells these products in
domestic or foreign markets. In this way, SFMR is engaged in the creation and implemen-
tation of both domestic and foreign agricultural trade policies of the Czech government.
SFMR was designed to work both as a market stabilizer and a farmers’ support program.
During the first years of its existence, its programs involved many agricultural commodities.
The gradual tendency was to narrow its focus, so that in 1995 it was only engaged in
the trade of cereals and milk products. For farmers the forward buying of agricultural
commodities by SFMR served as a very important source of money paid in advance under
favourable conditions.
The subsidies provided under the subsidy programs of the Czech Ministry of Agriculture
were always targeting some special goals. Under these programs, in the majority of cases,
the farmers had to formally apply for a given program and the Ministry of Agriculture
had no obligation to accept the application. The support included a very wide array of
subsidized activities ranging from the support of beef pastures to the creation of information
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systems for agriculture. The methods of support were also varied from direct monetary
payments to direct loans or subsidies for interest payments on ordinary commercial loans.
From the beginning of 1994, this system was supplemented by the Support and Guar-
antee Fund for Farmers and Forestry (further abbreviated as the Guarantee Fund), which
came to be viewed as the single most important instrument of government support for
agriculture, as emphasized by the Czech Vice-Prime Minister and Minister of Agriculture
Lux (1996). The importance of the Guarantee Fund is obvious from the comparison of the
government budget money budgeted in 1996 for agriculture through the Guarantee Fund,
which was 3.1 bil. Kc (Lux, 1996), with the money budgeted for the subsidies programs
of the Ministry of Agriculture, which was 2.4 bil. Kc, and with the money budgeted for
SFMR, which amounted to 1.5 bil. Kc (Doucha, 1996).
1.3 The Sources of Guarantee Fund
The Guarantee Fund was founded on July 22, 1993 as a stock company. The Ministry
of Agriculture, represented by a Minister of Agriculture, is the only shareholder of the
Guarantee Fund. The Guarantee Fund started its support and guarantee activities in
March 1994.
The starting capital of the Guarantee Fund was composed from a subsidy of 2.65 bil.
Kc from the government budget and from the portfolio of shares in the nominal value of 3.8
bil. Kc. These shares were primarily shares of the food industry enterprises reserved by the
governmental Fund of National Property from the first wave of voucher privatization. These
shares were sold by the Fund of National Property to the Guarantee Fund at the symbolic
price of one thousandth (1/1000) of their nominal value. Of course, the nominal value of
this portfolio was quite different from its market value. According to my estimations given
in appendix 2, the market value of that portfolio at the beginning of 1994 was somehow
more than one half of its nominal value (depending on assumptions used, our estimation
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is in the range of 2.07 bil. Kc to 2.5 bil. Kc).
In 1995, the Guarantee Fund was given 2.1 bil Kc from the government budget and its
portfolio was again supplemented by the shares of some enterprises engaged in the storage
and processing of agricultural raw materials. These shares from the second wave of voucher
privatization, in the nominal value of 1.9 bil Kc, were again sold to the Guarantee Fund
by the Fund of National Property with a price of one thousandth of their nominal value.
For the year 1996, the government budget allocated 3.1 bil Kc for the Guarantee Fund.
The Czech government also decided to give the Guarantee Fund some more shares from
the Fund of National Property and from the Land Fund in 1996 (Slavicek, 1996, p.5).
The Guarantee Fund operates as a separate legal entity which means that once the
Guarantee Fund obtains money from the government budget, it is not obliged to return
the remaining money not used for guarantees or subsidies at the end of year.
1.4 The Programs of the Guarantee Fund
The Guarantee Fund provides guarantees and/or subsidies of the credit extended to the
entrepreneurs in agriculture and forestry by commercial banks. According to the Guide-
lines for the Provision of Guarantee and Subsidy through the Guarantee Fund (1996), the
maximum size of the guarantee depends on the duration of the loan. It is 50% of the total
size of the loan for loans up to 2 years, 70% for loans between 2 and 5 years, and 85% for
loans over 5 years.
The size of the interest rate subsidy is stated quarterly by the board of directors of
the Guarantee Funds. During the whole period of 1994-1995, it was stated as 10%. It is
possible to obtain a higher guarantee of up to 100% or a higher subsidy. The size of the
subsidy must always be such that the borrower pays at least 1% interest himself.
There are some conditions which determine who is eligible for support by the Guarantee
Fund. The most important of them are concerned with definitions of who should be
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considered a farmer (or as the entrepreneur in forestry) for the purposes of the Guarantee
Fund. The important condition for cooperatives is that the support of the Guarantee Fund
could be given to them only if they already satisfied all the requirements connected with
the return of restituted property. The satisfaction of this requirement is determined by a
county officer of the Ministry of Agriculture. This condition gives the ministry a powerful
tool to coerce cooperatives to fulfil their obligation to the people to whom the cooperatives
have some obligations concerning property restitutions.
Any guarantee or subsidy has to be provided in the framework of some of the following
programs of the Guarantee Fund. As of March 1996, there are 9 programs in force.
The most important of them is the Farmer program. This program is aimed at sup-
porting investment in agriculture. It covers the purchases of machinery and animal herds,
building investments and other agricultural investments. Both guarantees and subsidies
are provided in this program.
The Services and Running Expenses programs are the next most important programs.
The Services program is used to support investments in machinery purchases for enterprises
providing productions services for agriculture. The Running Expenses program covers
credit for seeds, fertilizers, payments for technological services provided to farmers, and
credit for other operative expenses. Both guarantees and subsidies are provided in those
programs.
The New Owner program provides a 100% guarantee for the first repayment of the loan
for borrowers who bought government property in order to use it for farming.
The Restitution program is designed to guarantee loans taken by cooperatives in order
to pay restitution claims to former members or to people whose property a cooperative
uses.
The Inventories program was constituted to help those farmers who privatized former
government owned state farms. These farmers are now liable for old loans issued for
material inventories connected with the seasonal character of agricultural production. The
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Inventories program provides a guarantee of up to 30% of the value of such loans.
The remaining three programs (Landscape, Youth, and Agro-region) are used only as
a supplementary bonification to the basic programs: Farmer, Running Expenses and Ser-
vices. All these programs increase the interest rate subsidy provided in the basic program
by a given number of percentage points.
The Landscape program can be used by farmers whose land is in national parks, water
source areas or other environmentally protected areas. These geographical areas eligible
for the Landscape program are listed in the environment protection laws.
The Youth program can be used by young farmers up to the age of 35 years.
The Agro-region program is designed to provide support to agricultural activities in
geographical areas with a high level of unemployment or in areas with naturally difficult
conditions for agricultural production. The list of these areas is provided by the adminis-
tration of the Guarantee Fund.
Besides the provision of credit subsidies and guarantees, the Guarantee Fund sometimes
uses its money to solve some pressing problems of agricultural finance. An example of such
an activity was the use of 159.8 mil Kc of Guarantee Funds money in 1994 to purchase the
receivables to be received by primary agricultural producers from meal and milk processing
firms. The Guarantee Fund paid farmers 60%-80% of the nominal value of these receiv-
ables. These interventions show how the Ministry of Agriculture uses its position as 100%
shareholder to solve some problems which, according to its mission statement, should not
be dealt with by the Guarantee Fund.
1.5 Results of the Operations of the Guarantee Fund
The total volume of support provided by the Guarantee Fund according to its different
programs since its beginning in March 1994 up to the December 19, 1995 is given in
Table 6
11
Table 6: Activities of Guarantee Fund According to Programs
Program Appli- Accepted Rejected Size Guarantee Subsidy
cations appli- appli- of
total cations cations loan
(Number) (Number) (Number) (Ths.Kc) (Ths.Kc) (Ths.Kc)
Running expenses 1663 1541 122 4158479 749378 419181
Farmer 3599 3330 269 10936296 4408226 2744562
Services 249 226 23 1220923 790802 305874
Restitution 12 11 1 17069 0 3320
New owner 27 19 8 31421 31421 0
Landscape 1039 963 76 0 0 0
Youth 631 589 42 0 0 0
Agro-region 633 594 39 0 0 0
Source: Slavicek (1996).
Guarantee Fund support was given to practically all applications which were cleared
by the banks. 423 applications were rejected because of some violation of the requirements
given in the by-laws of the Guarantee Fund, and not based on the economic analysis of the
application package.
The weighted average of the interest rates for the loans supported by the Guarantee
Fund was 15.06%, which is approximately 2 percentage points higher than the economy-
wide interest rates given in Table 5. This fact indicates that probably banks charge some-
how higher interest rate for the guaranteed loans than would be justified by a risk category
of these loans. Due to the interest rate subsidy, the weighted average of the interest
rates paid by the farmers was only 3.80%. For the farmers involved in the supplementary
programs (Landscape, Youth, and Agro-region), which together accounted for 42% of all
accepted applications for support, the interest rate paid by a farmer was given by the ad-
ministratively stated lower bound of 1%. This empirical evidence shows that banks are not
able (or not willing) to fully exploit the possibilities of government interest rate subsidies
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Table 7: Activities of Guarantee Fund According to Type of Firm
Type Appli- Accepted Rejected Size Guarantee Subsidy
of firm cations appli- appli- of
total cations cations loan
(Number) (Number) (Number) (Ths.Kc) (Ths.Kc) (Ths.Kc)
Family farmer 2470 2279 191 3595872 1571636 891950
Limited liability comp. 998 891 107 4019889 2053412 784201
Joint stock comp. 466 430 36 2703042 890396 602496
Cooperative 1540 1469 71 5808690 1413973 1148276
Others 76 58 18 236695 50410 46027
Total 5550 5127 423 16364188 5979827 3472950
Source: Slavicek (1996).
and to raise the interest rate (before deducting the government subsidy) high above the
market interest rate.
The fact, which came as a surprise to the designers of the Guarantee Funds, is the very
low default rate of the farmers involved in the programs of the Guarantee Fund. Up to
the end of 1995, there were only 8 calls for the Guarantee Fund to pay its guarantees in
the total value of 27.7 mil Kc. Two of them were from one cooperative which is presently
in liquidation; one was from a firm providing services for agriculture. The remaining five
defaults, in the total value of 13.2 mil Kc., were from five private farmers.
The decomposition of the Guarantee Fund support, according to the ownership form
of the enterprise, is given in Table 7 for the cumulative data covering the period from
March 1994 up to December 19, 1995. The data show that the largest recipients of the
support were cooperatives, which accounted for 35.49% of the 16.36 mil Kc. total volume
of supported credit. This is somehow lower than the share of the cooperatives in the total
area of Czech agricultural land, which was 47.7% in April 1995 (The Report on the State
of the Czech Agriculture, 1995, p.85).
The high share (44.45%) of family farmers out of the total number of accepted appli-
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cations for supported loans is intuitively plausible since it shows that, on average, family
farmers ask for lower loans than cooperatives or other forms of farms.
Since the beginning activities of the Guarantee Fund up to the December 19, 1995,
credit support was provided for loans realized through 34 banks, as it is shown in Table 8.
The most interesting fact shown in Table 8 is that 63.22% of all supported credit was ex-
tended by two big banks. Thirty banks with small shares of the supported credit accounted
only for 13.68% of the total volume of the supported credit.
In order to determine what are the social, economic, and technological characteristics
of the recipients of the Guarantee Fund support, I computed correlation coefficients ρ
between the volume of supported credit extended in each county of the Czech Republic
and a number of characteristics of each county.
The most tight correlation is for the gross agricultural production per hectare, where
ρ = 0.53. This shows that the support goes to areas with high levels of production.
This conjecture is also supported by a positive correlation for the production ability of
agricultural land ρ = 0.26. The production ability of agricultural land is a technological
coefficient based on the energy equivalent of agricultural production which can be produced
on a given land. Similarly, the correlation coefficient for steepness of land (ρ = −0.34) and
for the elevation over sea level (ρ = −0.13) show that the support does not go to mountain
or hilly regions.
As could be expected, the support of the Guarantee Fund is not used much in industrial
regions. This is documented by the correlation coefficient ρ = −0.21 for the level of
nonagricultural production per person and by the correlation coefficient ρ = −0.28 for the
population density.
There is no strong relationship between the support by the Guarantee Fund and the
desirability of living in a given county, as proxied by the net migration balance. The
correlation coefficient for this characteristic was ρ = 0.04. Also, the relationship between
the support by the Guarantee Fund and the level of unemployment is quite weak, ρ =
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Table 8: Activities of the Guarantee Fund According to Banks
Name Appli- Accepted Rejected Size Guarantee Subsidy
of bank cations appli- appli- of
total cations cations loan
(Number) (Number) (Number) (Ths.Kc) (Ths.Kc) (Ths.Kc)
Komercni banka 1873 1740 133 6130651 477572 1219622
Agrobanka 1666 1568 98 4214424 2167216 826946
Ces. sporitelna 839 780 59 1994700 989035 544750
Inv. a Postovni 502 459 43 1785928 1054567 386579
Ekoagrobanka 100 91 9 156481 58576 33208
Banka Hana 92 80 12 206754 32701 27637
Kreditni banka 81 49 32 170935 67146 46206
Zemska banka 80 74 6 144594 52549 12674
Ces. pojistovna 77 75 2 103540 12950 17535
Moravia banka 43 40 3 147658 98317 46074
Wein. Sparkasse 37 36 1 301319 254820 49376
Bank. dum SKALA 21 16 5 322620 273122 83881
Universal banka 18 16 2 20370 10094 2137
Pragobanka 17 15 2 103699 53729 11308
Waldvier. Spark. 16 13 3 143830 120331 51245
Foresbank 14 14 0 55952 41306 7998
Cs. obchodni 12 10 2 24741 12880 6168
Evrobanka 12 10 2 11842 6442 2718
Banka Bohemia 9 8 1 10036 200 827
Velkomoravska 8 7 1 23325 14228 1798
COOP banka 5 4 1 5275 2200 547
GiroCredit 5 5 0 147850 110973 53689
Union banka 3 3 0 45000 36750 12384
Plzenska banka 3 3 0 8664 0 751
Podnikatelska 3 2 1 8550 6623 762
Unidentified 2 0 2 0 0 0
Ceska narodni 2 2 0 27600 0 3186
Credit Lyonnais 2 1 1 6000 0 2462
AB banka 1 1 0 1000 0 188
Interbanka 1 1 0 600 0 61
Creditanstalt 1 0 1 0 0 0
Bank Austria 1 1 0 7700 0 0
Bayerische Vere 1 0 1 0 0 0
BNP Dresdner 1 1 0 1450 0 0
Prvni mestska 1 1 0 1100 0 203
Spar. Muhlvierte 1 1 0 30000 25500 20016
Source: Slavicek (1996).
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−0.05.
The measurements of correlation show that the Guarantee Fund should not be viewed
primarily as a tool of social policy alleviating social tension in poor areas unsuitable for
agricultural production and suffering from depopulation. On the contrary, the support
of the Guarantee Fund goes to the areas with good natural conditions for agricultural
production. The strong correlation between the gross agricultural production per hectare
and the volume of credit extended with the Guarantee Fund support emphasizes the role
of the Guarantee Fund as a production promoting mechanism.
1.6 Programs Similar to the Guarantee Fund
1.6.1 The Czech Programs
The start of the Guarantee Fund in the Czech Republic was preceded by the establishment
of two similar institutions outside of the area of agriculture. These are the Exports Guaran-
tee and Insurance Company (EGIC) and the Czech-Moravian Guarantee and Development
Bank (CMGDB).
The EGIC was founded in 1992 with starting capital provided by the government budget
and in the following years it received additional subsidies from the government budget. The
shareholders of the EGIC are the Czech economic ministries. Its main activities are the
insurance and provision of credit guarantees for export and import credits and the provision
of interest rate subsidies to exporters.
The CMGDB was also founded in 1992. Its mission was to be a specialized bank
providing services and government support to small and intermediate entrepreneurs. The
Czech government, represented by the Ministry of Economy holds 32.7% of the shares
of the CMGDB. The rest of the shares are held by five commercial banks. The Czech
government provided part of the starting capital of the CMGDB and the Czech government
also provided a reserve fund for the CMGDB. Every year the Czech government also gives
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bank budget funds to finance special support programs (Cernohorsky, 1995). Several of
these programs exist.
The Start and Development programs are the most important in the terms of spend
resources. The Start program is used by small enterprises with less than 25 employees for
financing projects with projected costs less than 10 mil Kc. The Development program
can be used by firms with 500 employees or less. To be eligible for support from either
of these programs, the project has to satisfy at least one of a number of criteria, such
as the creation of new jobs, the use of progressive technologies and so on. Generally it
seems that similarly, as in the case of agricultural Guarantee Fund, it would be possible to
show for almost any project that it satisfies some of these conditions used for inclusion in
the programs of CMGDB. For the Development program, support is restricted to projects
realized in one of the three listed counties.
There are many similarities between CMGDB and the agricultural Guarantee Fund.
Both of them provide guarantees and interest rate subsidies for credits provided by com-
mercial banks in the framework of the special programs.
The important difference between these two institutions is that CMGDB acts more like
an independent banking institution and less like a government agency disbursing govern-
ment budget money to the targeted population. This is documented by the fact that the
CMGDB requires payment of a guarantee fee from the receiver of the guarantee as opposed
to the Guarantee Fund which provides the guarantees for free. Besides the disbursement
of credit guarantees and subsidies, the CMGDB also serves as an agency for the distribu-
tion of some government financial support for some activities not connected with credit
provision. Finally, the CMGDB is also active as an ordinary commercial bank in the area
of investment banking.
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1.6.2 The Western Programs
The existence of EGIC and CMGDB was an obvious domestic source of inspiration in the
creation of the Guarantee Fund. Nevertheless, the primary source of inspiration for the
Guarantee Fund for Czech agricultural policymakers and agricultural economists was the
U.S. Farmers Home Administration (FmHA). This is documented in a number of articles
in Czech academic journals [Becvarova (1993a,b, 1994), Doucha (1993a,b), Prouza (1994)].
While the idea of the provision of loan guarantees and subsidies to the farmers is the same
both in the U.S. and in the Czech Republic, there are significant differences between both
countries’ approaches.
The most important difference is that the Czech borrowers who will be provided govern-
ment support are selected by commercial banks. The Guarantee Fund provides its support
almost automatically contingent upon the decision of the bank and upon the satisfaction
of the general eligibility conditions. This feature is connected with the absence of the huge
country-wide administration network of the support programs in the Czech Republic as
opposed to the more than 2000 offices with more than 11000 full time employees in the
U.S. FmHA (FmHA, 1990).
The Czech Guarantee Fund is much more specialized in the provision of credit subsidies
and guarantees to agriculture and forestry and does not provide direct loans or other types
of support as does FmHA. It also does not provide a wide array of support programs to
non-agricultural businesses and social activities as is the case with FmHA.
The Farm Credit System also plays an important role in the U.S. support of farmers,
which does not have any counterpart in the Czech Republic.
The situation of farm credit in EU countries is different than the situation in the U.S.
Generally, there is much less attention devoted to the support of farm credit in the EU than
in the U.S. Institutional representation of this difference is the fact that there is no special
institution of farm credit support included in the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) of
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the EU.
Nevertheless, there are farm credit programs run on a national basis in individual
member states of the EU. But the weight given to these programs is quite different in
individual countries. It ranges from the strong governmental interventions in France to the
near absence of any government run farm credit programs in the United Kingdom. The
low attention given by the EU to farm credit is shown by the fact that as opposed to huge
literature about CAP, we were able to find only one book providing an overview of the
farm credit policies in the EU countries. This book (Balz, Losch, Meimberg, and Mahlau,
1993) was published in German, and it was used as a major source for the overview of EU
farm credit policies prepared in Czech by Becvarova and Fritzova (1994b).
The approach of the EU to farm credit programs is especially important for transition
economies planning to join the EU in the near future. From this point of view, the most
relevant is the approach to agricultural credit in Portugal, which became a member of the
EU in 1986. Similar to the Czech Republic, Portugal is a small country with a GDP much
lower than the average of rich EU countries. The less developed rural structure and the
high share of informal credit in the total agricultural credit make Portugal also a bridging
case between the conditions of European agricultural credit markets and the conditions in
rural credit markets of developing countries.
In the period before EU accession in 1986, some agricultural credit programs were oper-
ational in Portugal. The most important of them was the SIFAP program of interest rates
subsidies. As opposed to the Czech bank driven programs, the SIFAP program was sub-
jected to extensive government approval procedures. Farmers intending to obtain SIFAP
credit subsidies were required to submit a very detailed investment plan by completing a
forty-page application form. These were then reviewed for approval by the supervisory gov-
ernment agency and by the staff of the commercial bank to which the loan application was
submitted. This costly bureaucratic set of procedures led to lengthy delays of approvals
and created considerable uncertainty as to the chances for success of a credit support appli-
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cation. Typically, only larger farmers who could more easily afford high transaction costs
were the recipients of the benefits of the SIFAP program (Pearson, Monke, and Avillez,
1985).
The accession to the EU and to the CAP does not automatically imply the obligation to
discontinue the national credit support programs. The adoption of the CAP requires only
the abolition of all commodity-specific subsidies, except as permitted by individual CAP
commodity regimes. Since the credit support programs are usually not commodity-specific,
they are allowed to coexist with the CAP. Nevertheless, after the accession of Portugal into
the EU, the interest rate subsidies program SIFAP was discontinued. It was replaced by
the farm investment subsidies program under EC Regulation 797/1985. The 797 program
consists of capital subsidies through which the government pays a specified percentage of
the capital costs of qualifying investments directly. A very important institutional feature
of the 797 program is that the application process for 797 capital subsidies is much less
cumbersome than was that for SIFAP interest subsidies.
The dominance of direct subsidies over interest rate subsidies was clearly revealed after
1991, when Portugal received permission from the EU to offer farmers the choice between
capital subsidies and interest rate subsidies. According to Monke et al. (1993), this per-
mission did not lead to a switch from direct subsidies to interest rate subsidies. Portuguese
banks did not show much interest in establishing agricultural lending programs using in-
terest rate subsidies. The farmers also preferred the direct capital subsidies which do
not necessitate formal borrowing and which place a much lower administrative burden on
farmers.
The Portuguese experience shows that the accession of the Czech Republic should not
be by itself a reason for discontinuing the credit guarantees and interest rate subsidies
programs. The low administrative requirements of the Czech Guarantee Funds programs
lead to the conjecture that it could overcome the problems which led to the death of the
Portuguese interest subsidies program.
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There also exist a number of non-agricultural credit guarantee schemes in developed
countries (US, Canada, United Kingdom, Germany, France, Italy, Netherlands), as de-
scribed by Levitsky and Prasad (1987) and by Barrett et al. (1990). These schemes are
usually designed to help small and medium sized businesses. These schemes differ widely
according to their definitions of small and medium sized businesses, according to types of
projects eligible for support, according to loan security and borrower commitments required
and according to the level of guarantees and premium fees paid by the borrower.
1.6.3 The Programs in Transition Economies
There are significant attempts to support agricultural credit in all European transition
economies. The approaches are different according to the position of agriculture in the
national economies of the individual countries and according to their general economic
philosophies.
The Slovak government’s agricultural policy is very similar to Czech policies, as a legacy
of their common heritage. The design of the Slovak Guarantee Fund was generally copied
from the Czech design. The most significant difference between the Czech and Slovak
Guarantee Funds is in the sources of financing. The Slovak Guarantee Fund did not obtain
the portfolio of shares to finance its activities. Instead it relies on direct appropriations
from the government budget and on a share of proceeds obtained from the sale of state
owned food industry enterprises.
As opposed to the Czech Republic and Slovakia, there is strong tendency to establish not
only an “administratively thin” credit support fund, but also to create special institutions
specialized in rural credit provision in other European transition countries.
In Hungary a direct government provision of subsidized agricultural credit is provided
by the Hungarian Agricultural Development Fund. Funds and expert assistance provided
by the EU PHARE program are used for the development of savings cooperatives. There
was also established, with the financial support of PHARE program, the Agricultural
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Enterprise Credit Guarantee Foundation in Hungary (Swinnen, 1995). As far as we know,
there does not exist any special credit guarantees institution in Poland. Agricultural credit
support in Bulgaria is organized primarily through credit subsidies for loans provided by
commercial banks and through the establishment of special banking institutions specialized
in direct provision of subsidized agricultural loans (Sturgess, 1994).
Agricultural credit in Romania is supported by direct subsidized loans from the gov-
ernment and by support to specialized agricultural commercial banks. Since the beginning
of August 1994, the Rural Credit Guarantee Fund (RCGF) is also operating in Romania
(Diacenco and Leonte, 1995).
According to the information available, it seems that the RCGF combines the good
business practices of the U.S. FmHA with the strongly specialized approach of the Czech
Guarantee Fund. The RCGF requires commercial banks, whose loans it guarantees, to pay
a guarantee fee depending on the size of the loan. The RCGF provides its own analysis
of each credit application and does not provide virtually automatic guarantees as does the
Czech Guarantee Fund. The RCGF only provides guarantees for agricultural loans and it
is not engaged in any other activity.
There also exist a number of rural credit support schemes in the developing countries all
around the world. The empirical experience from those programs is collected by Adams,
Graham and Von Pischke (1983), and by Von Pischke (1992). The general lesson from
developing countries is that the default rates are typically very high and that many of the
benefits of these programs appear to go to the wealthier farmers.
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2 The Value of the Portfolio Endowment of the Guar-
antee Fund
The accounts of the Guarantee Fund operate with the nominal value of its endowment
portfolio. This nominal value is based on book values of the food enterprises, the shares
of which compose the Guarantee Fund portfolio. Even taking into account inflation, the
book value of these enterprises is still much higher than their real market value.
The easiest estimation of the market value of the share portfolio would be given by:
H(1) =
n∑
i=1
qipi, (1)
where i = 1, . . . , n is the index of the firm, whose shares are in the portfolio,
pi is the stock-exchange price of one share of the firm i,
qi is the number of shares of the firm i in the evaluated portfolio.
Unfortunately, the underdeveloped Czech capital market at the time of the establish-
ment of Guarantee Fund did not allow to find the market price of share just by looking at
the everyday stock exchange quotation.
The situation is also complicated by the parallel existence of two stock exchange systems
in the Czech Republic. One of them is the RMS system, which was created in order to
administer voucher privatization. The other is the Prague Stock Exchange (PSE), which
was founded with the goal to create a stock exchange which would evolve into the standard
western type of stock exchange.
In 1993 and 1994, both these stock exchanges traded in shares of approximately equal
sets of enterprises, but they operated under different rules. The common mode of their
operations was that they operated in a discrete time framework of separate rounds. During
the period between their rounds, they collected the offers and bids for the shares, compared
them and announced the results of a given round. One of the differences between these
systems was that the periods between the rounds of RMS were longer than it was in the
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case of the PSE.
We have evaluated the value of the portfolio of the Guarantee Fund separately based
on the data provided by trading on the RMS and on the PSE.
The initial portfolio of the Guarantee Fund consisted from shares of 101 firms. For the
evaluation of the portfolio, we have used the data generated by trading up to the end of
1993.
2.1 RMS
The RMS trading used in our estimation covered seven rounds starting in September
1993. The data released by RMS provided the so called ”auction prices” for all 101 firms
in the portfolio of the Guarantee Fund in each of these seven rounds. Because of the
discrete character of trading and because of the start of the trading from a practically
arbitrary point which was given by the book value of shares the algorithm used by RMS
for the determination of auction prices needed several rounds of RMS to converge to some
meaningful values.
The resulting market value of the portfolio of the Guarantee Fund as of the end of 1993
is given in column 8 of Table 9 as H(1) = 2.15 bil Kc.
The history of the evolution of the value H(1) of the portfolio of the Guarantee Fund
is given in Table 9. It shows that up to the fifth round, the value H(1) decreased with
decreasing speed. Since the sixth round there was an increase in the value of the portfolio
given in column 8. The same pattern was also followed by the average price of share
(column 6), which we defined as the total volume of really performed transactions in Kc
(column 7) divided by the total number of shares which were really traded (column 3).
The relation of the portfolio value H(1) and this average share price can be seen from the
column 13 of Table 9. This column is computed as value H(1) from column 8 divided by
the total number of shares in the portfolio of the Guarantee Fund.
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Table 9: Firms in the portfolio of Guarantee Fund,traded in RMS – part 1
Round Number Number Demand Supply Average Volume Value
number of of for of price of of
firms traded shares shares of trade portfolio
shares share H(1)
Units (number) (number) (number) (number) (Kc) (mil. Kc) (bil. Kc)
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
1 101 1107 1330 169285 766 0.85 3.708
2 101 1034 1650 36597 572 0.59 2.485
3 101 1595 2769 17359 340 0.54 1.761
4 101 2674 7505 7945 311 0.83 1.662
5 101 4407 34352 7824 311 1.37 1.560
6 101 7155 32618 12585 338 2.42 1.700
7 101 9512 31246 16866 491 4.67 2.147
Total NA 27484 111470 268461 NA 11.27 NA
Average NA 3926.29 15924.29 38351.57 NA 1.61 2.15
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Table 10: Firms in the portfolio of Guarantee Fund,traded in RMS – part 2
Round Number of firms for which Value
number Demand Supply Number Demand of
> 0 > 0 of > portfolio
trades supply per
> 0 share
Units (number) (number) (number) (number) (Kc)
1 9 10 11 12 13
1 43 101 40 1 921
2 35 95 33 4 617
3 47 95 46 8 437
4 60 94 56 33 413
5 86 93 83 46 387
6 87 96 84 51 422
7 88 98 87 47 533
Total 446 672 429 190 NA
Average 63.71 96.00 61.29 27.14 NA
Source: Database of RMS
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The relative quality of the portfolio of the Guarantee Fund could also be evaluated by
the comparison of this portfolio with the data for the RMS as a whole. These data are
given in Table 11.
2.2 PSE
PSE started to operate already in the middle of 1992, but at that time it covered shares
of only a few firms. For the evaluation of the portfolio of the Guarantee Fund we have
considered only the last 29 trading rounds in 1993. This covers the time period from
July 13, 1993 to December 16, 1993. We label these rounds by ordinal numbers 1-29 in
Tables 12 and 13.
Considering that the time period between two rounds of RMS is longer than the time
period between two rounds of PSE, we use in the case of PSE not only the definition of
the portfolio value as given by H(1) in the equation (1), but we also use an alternative
definition. The alternative valuation, labeled as H(2), is obtained by using formula (1)
with pi defined by the following way:
1. If the quoted price for a given share is given, this price is used as pi.
2. If there is no quoted price for a given share in a given round, we use the nearest
previous or following quoted price of the given share.
3. If the time distance of the nearest previous and following quoted price is the same,
we use the quoted price from the previous round.
4. If the nearest quoted price is farther than five rounds, we define pi = 0.
The explanatory values of the first nine rounds which cover the period up to the start
of the trading on RMS is quite restricted because the volume of trade was very low.
As opposed to the RMS, the PSE does not release the estimate of the price of the share
for all firms in each round. This means that the estimated value H(1) of the portfolio
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Table 11: All firms traded in RMS
Round Number Number Demand Supply Average Volume
number of of for of price of
firms traded shares shares of trade
shares share
Units (number) (number) (number) (number) (Kc) (mil. Kc)
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1 998 95778 254930 1995834 401 38.41
2 988 395265 624676 1121942 639 252.57
3 1000 1458246 1764618 1643359 722 1052.85
4 1012 958252 1501093 1072602 701 671.73
5 1034 767626 1356184 912677 664 509.70
6 1061 231643 986615 520298 341 78.99
7 1084 352790 1850423 739028 482 170.04
Total NA 4259600 8338539 8005740 NA 2774.31
Average NA 608514 1191220 1143677 NA 396.33
Round Number of firms for which
number Demand Supply Number Demand
> 0 > 0 of >
trades supply
> 0
Units (number) (number) (number) (number)
1 9 10 11 12
1 463 977 432 37
2 477 907 446 111
3 512 884 471 186
4 656 873 594 379
5 785 888 727 500
6 820 939 762 493
7 894 987 856 556
Total 4607 6455 4288 2262
Average 658 922 613 323
Source: Database of RMS
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in the first half of considered rounds is based on a very small set of firms. This leads to
an extremely low value H(1), under 1 bil Kc. Similarly, the number of firms used for the
computation of an alternative value H(2) is quite low in these first rounds.
The tradebility of the portfolio of the Guarantee Fund is described in Table 13, which
provides the number of firms in this portfolio according to their trading status in each
round.
The possible states of the trading status, as determined by the operating rules of PSE,
are described in the following paragraphs:
Perfect equilibrium means that the number of shares supplied and demanded is equal.
Local oversupply means, that the number of shares supplied is bigger than the number
of shares demanded. The resulting price computed according to the algorithms used by
PSE is, in this case, inside the allowed range.
Global oversupply means that the number of shares supplied is bigger than the number
of shares demanded and that the resulting price computed by PSE algorithms is outside
the allowed range. In this case, the automated trading system determines price on the
border of the allowed range and the trades are realized with the appropriate reduction of
the amounts of demanded and supplied shares.
Total oversupply means that the number of shares supplied is bigger than the number
of shares demanded and that the resulting price is so far out of the allowed range that no
trades are realized.
Local, global and total overdemands are defined symmetrically.
The market status nonquoted means that there was no demand or no supply or that
the offers and bids were so different that the prices on the demand and supply sides do not
overlap in any single case.
The results given in the Table 12 show that the value of the portfolio of the Guarantee
Fund based on the trading on the PSE was in the range from 2.07 bil. Kc to 2.50 bil. Kc.
The higher value achieved at PSE corresponds to the generally higher price level at PSE
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Table 12: The results of portfolio of Guarantee Fund achieved on PSE
Round Number Number Value Average Number Number Value Number
number of of of price of of of of firms
firms traded portfolio of quoted traded portfolio used to
shares H(1) share firms firms H(2) calculate
H(2)
Units (number) (number) (bil.Kc) (number) (number) (number) (bil.Kc) (number)
1 99 0 1.683 0 8 0 2.271 27
2 99 4 0.470 1200 4 1 1.516 28
3 99 2 0.760 750 7 1 1.433 31
4 99 43 0.712 681 11 2 1.126 29
5 99 1 0.212 5000 8 1 1.037 30
6 99 40 0.428 423 10 4 1.008 31
7 99 11 0.182 335 7 3 1.008 35
8 99 19 0.327 308 13 4 1.118 42
9 99 79 0.420 287 12 8 1.226 50
10 100 216 0.671 283 15 9 1.329 56
11 100 203 0.664 228 19 9 1.343 58
12 100 263 0.865 430 25 18 1.378 57
13 100 256 1.112 461 32 23 1.775 59
14 100 406 1.047 457 36 15 1.721 59
15 97 281 1.055 538 39 17 1.790 63
16 100 727 1.329 383 39 14 1.914 65
17 100 162 1.185 444 28 14 2.113 72
18 100 883 1.716 490 33 17 2.265 73
19 100 774 1.573 740 31 20 2.250 75
20 100 857 1.820 1071 36 25 2.299 77
21 100 219 1.241 564 21 11 2.378 80
22 100 1155 1.983 996 43 24 2.393 82
23 100 549 1.557 1205 29 21 2.288 83
24 100 1447 1.942 810 47 25 2.248 83
25 100 853 1.831 774 41 26 2.184 83
26 100 944 1.881 886 42 20 2.209 83
27 100 831 1.856 1069 43 30 2.214 83
28 100 1357 2.100 1146 52 31 2.337 83
29 100 703 2.074 1206 41 24 2.496 83
Total NA 13285 NA NA 772 417 NA 1760
Average NA 458.10 1.196 NA 26.62 14.38 1.82 60.69
Source: Database of PSE.
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as compared to RMS.
3 Conclusions
The financial support for Czech agriculture during early transition was provided through
several institutions. The State Fund for Market Regulation (SFMR) is a government run
agency, which buys certain agricultural products under certain conditions, stores them
(or arranges for their storage by contract with some commercial enterprises) and again
sells these products in domestic or foreign markets. In this way, SFMR is engaged in the
creation and implementation of both domestic and foreign agricultural trade policies of the
Czech government.
SFMR was designed to work both as a market stabilizer and a farmers’ support program.
During the first years of its existence, its programs involved many agricultural commodities.
The gradual tendency was to narrow its focus, so that in 1995 it was only engaged in
the trade of cereals and milk products. For farmers the forward buying of agricultural
commodities by SFMR served as a very important source of money paid in advance under
favourable conditions.
The subsidies provided under the subsidy programs of the Czech Ministry of Agriculture
were always targeting some special goals. Under these programs, in the majority of cases,
the farmers had to formally apply for a given program and the Ministry of Agriculture
had no obligation to accept the application. The support included a very wide array of
subsidized activities ranging from the support of beef pastures to the creation of information
systems for agriculture. The methods of support were also varied from direct monetary
payments to direct loans or subsidies for interest payments on ordinary commercial loans.
From the beginning of 1994, this system was supplemented by the Support and Guar-
antee Fund for Farmers and Forestry (further abbreviated as the Guarantee Fund), which
came to be viewed as the single most important instrument of government support for
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agriculture. It financial backing was provided by a portfolio of privatized food enterprises.
The value of this portfolio was estimated in this paper.
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Table 13: Number of firms in the portfolio of Guarantee Fund according to the status of
the market achieved
Round Perfect Local Local Global Global Total Total Non-
number equi- over- over- over- over- ove- over- quoted
librium supply demand supply demand supply demand
1 0 0 0 0 0 8 0 91
2 0 0 1 0 0 3 0 95
3 0 1 0 0 0 6 0 92
4 1 0 1 0 0 9 0 88
5 1 0 0 0 0 7 0 91
6 1 1 1 0 1 5 1 89
7 0 1 1 1 0 3 1 92
8 1 1 2 0 0 7 2 86
9 1 3 2 0 2 3 1 87
10 1 1 6 0 1 4 2 85
11 1 1 3 1 3 6 4 81
12 0 0 11 4 3 7 0 75
13 3 7 10 1 2 2 7 68
14 1 6 5 0 3 15 6 64
15 2 3 7 2 3 17 5 58
16 1 2 6 2 3 10 15 61
17 1 0 10 2 1 10 4 72
18 1 4 7 1 4 3 13 67
19 0 6 8 0 6 7 4 69
20 2 9 10 2 2 6 5 64
21 0 1 6 2 2 6 4 79
22 1 7 9 5 2 11 8 57
23 0 6 8 5 2 6 2 71
24 0 5 13 1 6 18 4 53
25 0 4 14 5 3 11 4 59
26 1 4 11 1 3 12 10 58
27 1 9 13 3 4 8 5 57
28 0 7 14 3 7 7 14 48
29 1 4 15 1 3 4 13 59
Total 22 93 194 42 66 221 134 2116
Average 0.76 3.21 6.69 1.45 2.28 7.62 4.62 72.97
Source: Database of PSE.
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